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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RODNEY M. LARSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
12'13

EVA FREE KELLY,
Defendant-Respondent.

Appellant's Petition for Rehearing
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court
In and for Salt Lake County, Utah
The Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge

GERALD E. NIELSON

EVA FREE KELLY
Pro Se

840 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff·
App_ellant
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT'S CONCLUSION
THAT THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
"DEFENDANT AT NO TIME AGREED TO
AN EXTENSION AND THAT AT NO TIME
DID SHE AGREE TO ANYTHING BUT
1

STRICT PERFORMANCE OF THE TERM~
OF THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT A~L
OFFER TO PURCHASE," IS:
A. IN ERROR; AND
B. IS NOT CONCLUSIVE OF THE ISSl![
OF WHETHER PLAINTIFF PERFORMED
OR WAS EXCUSED FROM PERFORMING
BECAUSE IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO A(.
COUNT PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THA1
ABSENT SPECIFIC AGREEMENT ON THE
PART OF DEFENDANT SHE IS ESTOPPED
BY HER CONDUCT TO DENY THE COX.
TINUING VALIDITY OF THE EARNES1
MONEY AGREEMENT.
Plaintiff-Appellant's contention that the findJni
that Plaintiff did not agree to an extension of time,~
not supported by the record, is based (I) on the conver·
sation of the parties at Defendant's home on or about.
May 25th and ( 2) upon the modification by Plainti!!
of the original offer of Defendant which included tilt
April 15th date as follows~
"Home to be completed with items as per_al·
tached sheet. Said work to be completed 10 dil.~i
after a loan commitment is given by the bank on
property at 2870-72-7 4 South 3rd East," (emphasis added) ,
· t eo!
which modification was agreed to by the s1gna
ur
each of the parties. In that connection note that the pro·
vision was hand-written by Defendant; that by ana
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from its position on the Earnest Money Agreement it
was intended to modify the original offer. If it creates
an ambiguity with the April 15th completion provision,
all rules of construction of ambiguities favor the "ten
(10) days after a loan commitment," completion date.
Plaintiff's principal reliance is upon the conversation of about May 25th in Defendant's home between
Plaintiff and Defendant and Defendant's agent, Enoch
Bautista. Plaintiff testified that he explained to Defendant at that meeting that American Savings would
approve the loan subject to a pledged savings account
and that she (Defendant) indicated she did not need all
of her money at that time and that the $5,000.00 could
remain in the pledged savings account. He further testified that based on that conversation he immediately
undertook to finish the items Defendant required to be
done on the Clark Street property per the list she had
attached to the Earnest Money Agreement (R. Ill,
line 18 to R. 112 line 18 and R. 131line10-22).
Defendant testified that they decided in that conversation that the offer would be accepted according to
when the house was completed (R. 95 line 28-30); that
she would not have turned the offer down because of the
pledged savings account (R. 99 line 25 and 26); that as
a result of that conversation, Plaintiff was still working
on the transaction and that it was her intention that he
should (R. 146 line 26-30) .

Since that conversation occurred at a time well after
the April 15th date, Plaintiff contends that while he
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cannot point to testimony wherein Defendant said· ,
many words that she agreed to extend the time for com.
m~'
pletion of the agreement, it is clear either that she ilia
agree to extend the time for completion or that sn
acquiesced in the extention of it or that she regarded tfi:
agreement itself as providing for a later time. No otner
explanation has been offered by Defendant and Plain.
tiff respectfully submits no other explanation is poi·
sible. Nor is that testimony in any way denied, contra.
dieted or controverted by other factual testimony.
Even if Defendant did not agree to modifythetim1
within which the contract could be completed, either 01
the addition to the Earnest Money Agreement or by h;r
conversation in the latter part of May, she is estoppedfo
deny its continuing validity. She testified that she knew
Plaintiff was continuing to work on the transaction ana
she intended that he would ( R. 146 line 26-30). Plain.
tiff, in reliance on that understanding, incurred suo·
stantial expense to complete the Clark Street proper~
in accordance with Defendant's specification (R. rn
line 11-25).
If the court now allows Defendant to repudiatetlli
agreement because it was not completed by April 151~
it is saying she can knowingly allow Plaintiff to expena
time and money on the premise that they have an agrei·
ment and thereafter at her pleasure deny that agrei·
ment. Plaintiff contends it is a classic situation for t~I
application of the rules relating to estoppel and wah''.r
cited by Plaintiff at page 8 of his original Appe!lanl!

brief.
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Note that the Supreme Court's decision recites that
Defendant by her counsel notified Plaintiff that the
contract was terminated at a meeting on or about May
Z5th. The meeting on or about that date was one between
Plaintiff, Defendant and one Enoch Bautista in Defendant's home. The meeting referred to by the court
occurred ten ( 10) days to two ( 2) weeks later in a
realtor's office. There was no communication between
the parties between those meetings. Defendant's precipitous termination was the very next communication
from Defendant to Plaintiff after the meeting of May
25th. Plaintiff's improvements of the Clark Street property were done as a result of the May 25th meeting and
before the termination meeting.

CONCLUSION
It is with some reluctance and much trepidation
that Plaintiff asks the court to reconsider this appeal and
then simply quibbles about was the record shows the
facts were.
Plaintiff feels that the Supreme Court has overemphasized a finding of fact prepared by Defendant's
counsel and eventually signed by Judge Sawaya, even
though it did not represent his recollection of the matter
at the time of the hearing on Plaintiff's objections to
those proposed findings and was later adopted by Judge
Sawaya at Plaintiff's request upon the failure of Defendant's counsel to prepare new findings in accordance
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,.
with the court's oral instructions given to him at t~
hearing (see substance of the court's order R. 80·81).
That problem may have been compounded~
Plaintiff's failure to request oral argument. Plainilll
failed to request oral argument because Defendant W
not filed a brief and was not represented by an attornei.
Plaintiff did not wish to appear to pick on a defenseleii
woman. It later develops that the record was check~
out by Lambert Gibson and Defendant's prose briefwm
filed on the day before the hearing on appeal.
Plaintiff respect£ully asks the court to reconsid~
this matter and urges that it find that Defendant is not
entitled on or about May 25th to knowingly induce 01
even allow Plaintiff to incur substantial expense on ilii
strength of an agreement and thereafter terminate thal
agreement for Plaintiff's failure to complete it priorro
April 15th of the same year.
Respect£ully submitted:
Gerald E. Nielson
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
840 Kennecott Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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